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Abstract
In November of 1996, the electorate of California voted to abolish “affirmative action”. In this article I
trace the history of the “affirmative action” model in California and its impact on multicultural educa -
tion policies. I also discuss the possible effects of the abolition of “affirmative action” on the multicultu -
ral future of the University of California.
1 Introduction
In July of 1995, as the University of California campuses had sent most of their faculty,
their graduate students, and many of their regular undergraduate students on their three
months summer semester break, the Regents of the University of California voted behind
closed doors – and what seemed to be against the will of most chancellors, faculty, staff
and students of the nine campuses – to terminate the university’s “affirmative action”
programs. While there was no major organized resistance to this decision made behind
closed doors, some segments of the university community publicly criticized this decision.
However, in the aftermath to this historic July 1995 event, it remained unclear for a while
whether members of the university community primarily criticized the move to terminate
“affirmative action” because it meant to terminate “affirmative action”, or whether they
criticized the way this move was put into effect. For by not consulting with the various
governing boards of the university, the regents apparently disregarded a venerable
University of California tradition of shared governance. Given the recent election results in
California concerning Proposition 209, a proposition which moved to abolish “affirmative
action”, it is probably reasonable to assume that the university community was as split on
the issue as the electorate of California at large: the Proposition to abolish “affirmative
action” was passed, by however slight a margin. 54% of the electorate proposed it, and
46% opposed it. It is quite possible that the nature of these electoral results attest to the
complexities or even ambiguities inscribed in the notion of “affirmative action”, as well as
to the ways in which these complexities and ambiguities are perceived in particular
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historical moments and by diverse social strata and groups. For this reason, in the course of
this article, I will attempt to understand the current shift in educational politics in
California not independently from internal and externally driven socio-economic
developments. For if the success of “affirmative action” in the seventies and eighties
cannot be simply viewed in its U.S. American dimensions, but rather as a phenomenon that
is also tied to developments in international relations, the plight of “affirmative action” in
California of 1995-1996 must also be viewed in its connectedness to national and
international developments. In the age of globalization, political developments in
California enclose global relations.
2 The History and Politics of Affirmative Action
Before engaging with the complex relations which obtain between “affirmative action” and
global developments, let me remain with the simple relations which the “affirmative
action” model obtains with similar measures typically passed in western European social
democratic welfare states. For indeed, on some level “affirmative action” can be viewed as
a typical western social welfare measure. It is common in the twentieth century history of
western democracies to assuage economic and social differences between social strata by
proposing and implementing difference eliminating policies and measures. In the context
of such policies, citizens who fulfill specific criteria have access to programs over and
above citizens who do not fulfill such criteria. As it works out, citizens who do not fulfill
such criteria for qualifying for specific programs are usually also those who do not need to
benefit form specific programs. For instance, under German social law, a single mother of
limited financial self-sufficiency who would like to increase her skills and thus improve her
condition for greater employability and eventually for greater financial self-sufficiency is
eligible for government aid, whereas an already gainfully employed, and thus financially
self-sufficient single mother, is not. By the same token, young men and women from
families of the lower end of the economic income ladder are entitled to government
support for their university studies, whereas those from families in the middle and upper
ranks of the economic income ladder, as determined by taxable income, are not. Although
there are probably cases where eligibility requirements are subject to diverse
interpretations, the intentions informing such government policies and programs ultimately
focus on diminishing the impact of economic and social differences on the educational
options of its citizens, since, as long as educational levels directly correspond to income
level, access to educational options determine economic life chances. If the better educated
the citizen the more economically self-sufficient he/she becomes, the lesser educated the
less self-sufficient, and thus the more dependent on welfare state measures, the citizens
become. While this equation may now run up against the massive modernization impacts
the various countries within the European Union face in light of dramatic global trans-
formations in the area of finance, trade, markets, information processing, and production, it
is still worth pointing to the basic model of redistributive justice originally inscribed in that
equation.
1
The post-world-war two history of California’s educational politics is embedded in a
similar philosophical framework. For one, the State of California has a distinguished record
in terms of broadening the accessibility to public education for its citizenry. In fact,
admirers of the California university system like to call it the world’s most outstanding
public university, and with good reason. California’s so-called educational master plan, as
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it emerged in the early sixties, structured university education along three distinct tracks –
the community college system, the state university system, and the University of California
system respectively. Since, in contradistinction to state supported European universities,
which only demand a small free from students in exchange for their services, U.S.
American universities typically demand high fees and tuition from their students,
economically disadvantaged students are typically educationally disadvantaged.
California’s master plan hence designated the community college as its least expensive
institution for students, and the University of California as its most expensive. The
California State University system remained in the middle. This tripartite system enabled
most citizens, in principle, and whether rich or poor, to have access to public education. In
addition, since students who enrolled in community colleges were entitled to transfer into
the University system by fulfilling academic quality requirements, in principle socially
disadvantaged students could move up into the ranks of one of the most prestigious public
universities. Given this socially conscious master plan educational politicians and
educators developed in California of the late fifties and early sixties, it should come as no
surprise that in the course of the implementation of federally mandated “affirmative action”
models in the later sixties and seventies, the University of California would embrace not
only federally mandated plans, but also additional measures in order to attempt to preempt
life chances of its citizens. In other words, when “affirmative action”, the right to equal
educational and professional opportunity, swept through the educational systems of the
United States, the University of California not only followed the basic contours of the
programs as outlined by federal measures. It also expanded a variety of programs by
adding its own interpretations of “affirmative action”. For a university which is located in
the state of California, a state which is undergoing dramatic demographic shifts and
transformations, there were compelling reasons to expand the “affirmative action” model
beyond the federal mandate.
In its original form, the federal “affirmative action” model, often referred to as Title VII
and Title IX, by law required all those institutions receiving federal grants to not
discriminate against candidates for staff and professorial positions on the basis of race,
creed, color, or national origin. It also considered it illegal to discriminate on the same
basis against students who applied for admission to a public university. As historian of the
“affirmative action” model, J.D. Skrentny (1996), has recently pointed out, built into this
particular federal “affirmative action” model were features of its pre-history in a civil rights
model, which, tied to classical liberalism and specific notions of justice, attempted to
protect individuals from racist hiring practices by insisting on their universal rights as
abstract individuals.
2
 In other words, what civil rights laws attempted to protect were the
rights of individuals to be judged not on color but on merit. As the concept of “affirmative
action” developed further in the context of civil rights administrative agencies and the
courts, its original insistence on non-discrimination on the basis of color, or its color-blind
abstract universality, gradually turned into the legitimation of race-conscious concrete
particularities. In this evolution, the “affirmative action” model required all those
institutions receiving federal grants to not only to protect applicants from discrimination,
but also to specifically give preference in hiring for staff positions and academic positions
to specific candidates. This preferential treatment, to which, next to candidates for staff and
academic positions, also students as well as contractors with the university were entitled,
was clearly based on a concept of difference: individuals were entitled to preferential
treatment on the basis of their racial or ethnic rootedness in a group that differed from the
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predominant group in terms of the economic, social, and cultural advantages the
predominant groups typically enjoy. Those non-dominant, or marginal, groups who
typically did not enjoy or had not enjoyed specific social privileges were designated as
minority groups. Members of such groups legally received minority status, which enabled
them to become eligible for preferred consideration when contracting with or when
applying to federally supported institutions.
3
3 Social Justice and Cultural Recognition
Originally both minority and majority status were determined by race, whereby African
Americans typically represented the minority group and European Americans, federally
classified as Caucasians, the majority group. In addition, by the seventies and eighties, this
minority status was determined not simply by race, but also by ethnicity, and gender.
Typically, these included African Americans, Hispanics, Native Americans, and women.
Still, while European American male citizens, who are mostly white, would not qualify
under minority status, most members from minority groups, whether non-white or white,
were usually eligible. Also eligible were women. That is to say, while many individuals,
whether they belonged to a minority group or not, may have had limited chances to enjoy
equal educational opportunities due to their rootedness in an economically and socially
disadvantaged group, the social justice “affirmative action” intended to bestow excluded
non-minority groups. By the same token, although the demographic constitution of the
United States includes many different ethnic groups, including Asian Americans, Italian
Americans, and Americans from the Pacific Islands, the ethnic groups legally designated as
minority groups included African Americans, American Indians, and Hispanics in addition
to women. The logic informing this classificatory system is based on a common
denominator members of these various groups share. What these minority groups and
women had in common is that they have historically suffered and continue to suffer
discrimination due to racism and sexism. The philosophical and ethical framework which
enabled the subsequent evolution of the concept of “affirmative action” was based on the
premise that social discrimination of specific groups had taken place, and that, therefore, a
social solution would constitute the best solution to such a social problem. As the
“affirmative action” model moved through the seventies and eighties, it was understood as
being designed to not only acknowledge or recognize that social discrimination had taken
place, but also to redress historical discriminations with a social solution. Thus, one of the
key concepts in the evolution of multicultural social justice is the notion of “recognition”, a
term which received considerable attention in the philosophical, ethical, political, and legal
scholarship.
4
 If on a federal level the state made it illegal to discriminate against a person
on the basis of sex, race, religion, national origin and other features, specific plans
promoted under the concept of “affirmative action” enabled public institutions, such as the
University of California, to set up guidelines and regulations for promoting the expansion
of the eligibility of members of minority groups for preferred access to social resources.
Promoting the eligibility for admission to the University of California for minority
students, and for hiring of minority candidates for professorial positions and staff positions
turned into the major point of attention of educational policy makers.
Since the number of the faculty positions and staff positions at the university are finite –
the positions are contingent on state funding – giving preference to a minority candidate, or
to women, thus opened up the possibility for individual members of minority groups of
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having greater access to a limited social resource after the implementation of “affirmative
action” policies. By the same token, since only a finite number of students can be admitted
each year to the university’s entering undergraduate class, the university developed a set of
criteria on the basis of which to accept students. Before the advent of “affirmative action”,
the most important criteria for admission at the University of California, as elsewhere,
were scholarly achievements. Since achievements of this nature were and are related to the
economic background and social status of the student’s family, high school students from
economically advantaged backgrounds tended to come up with higher scores on
achievement test. Since historically members of minority groups belong to the poorer
segments of U.S. American society, the scholarly achievements of minority students tended
to not unrelated to the economic status of their families.
5
 In short, since there were more
non-whites than whites who scored below the scholarly level required for eligibility for
application to the university system, more minorities than whites were not eligible to apply.
And since there were more non-minority students who met the eligibility requirements,
more non-minority students attended the university. The model of equal opportunity,
fairness, and justice, deeply embedded in the classical liberal justice tradition, seemed to
run up against economic indicators, which in turn were often related to race.
6
 Since the
early to mid seventies, the University of California designed a series of additional
programs in the context of “affirmative action” which attempted to pay more detailed
attention to the intersection between race and class. In particular, due to the rapidly
changing demographic constitution of California’s population, the university sought
measures to redress historical discrimination against particular ethnic groups as it actively
promoted admissions policies which would reflect the increasing diversity of California’s
citizens. While it actively reserved a certain number of admission slots for members of
minority groups and women, its overall policy, as reflected in the 1989 Karabel report
(Karabel 1989), aimed at developing admissions criteria on the basis of which the
extraordinary diversity of the population of the State of California, and not simply
members of minority groups as classified by federal policy, would be reflected in the
undergraduate student population.
7
 As a public university, the University of California
aimed at serving its diverse public.
Since the number of undergraduate and graduate students the university can admit each
year is limited, reserving admission slots for minority students in practice precluded the
admission of non-minority students who fulfilled the scholarly eligibility requirements.
This led to a common assumption among some sectors of the population that the university
admitted unqualified minority students over and above qualified non-minority students, a
practice which was termed “reverse discrimination”. Indeed, individual cases tried in the
courts brought the notion of reverse discrimination to public attention, but reintroduced
debates on fairness, equal opportunity, and justice to the public sphere. However, contrary
to the belief that the scholarly records of minority students and women do not completely
fulfill the general admission requirements of the university, and that, by implication,
educational standards have been compromised, all substantive indicators point to the fact
that minority students and women admitted to the university not only fulfill the scholarly
admission requirements, but also that their scholarly output has hardly diminished
educational standards. For what the university “affirmative action” regulations instituted
was not admission procedures for underqualified candidates, but rather procedures by
which highly qualified minority high school students would gain access to the university in
the context of a quota system. The actual constitution of the student body of the University
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of California should reflect the actual demographic constitution of the state. Since there are
fewer European Americans than non-European Americans in California, in the context of a
social policy aimed at fair representation, fewer European Americans should have access
to state resources, including educational university resources. And since students of Asian
American origin tend to achieve good high school test scores, thereby raising the overall
eligibility level of Asian Americans for the University of California system, “affirmative
action”, by promoting the eligibility levels of non-Asian American and non-European
American ethnic groups, in principle attempted to assure that some disadvantaged groups
were offered a chance at educational advantage. Indeed, for as long as it lasted, the
University of California was proud of its institutionally practiced diversity based on a
concept of multi-racial, multi-ethnic, and multicultural justice. By voting to terminate
“affirmative action”, the regents of the University of California perhaps turned the most
famous public university of the United States into a more infamous institution: it should
become first among all public universities to terminate “affirmative action”. Earlier this
year, the “affirmative action” program at the University of Texas was ruled
unconstitutional by a New Orleans judge. And in recent electoral weeks, when explicitly
asked to either vote for or against “affirmative action”, more citizens of California voted
against than for it. They abolished “affirmative action”.
4 The End of an Era?
Given the impressive history of socially conscious educational policies in California, it is
somewhat surprising that the first steps towards ending preferences in staff and faculty
hiring and in university admissions policies – preferences which are steeped in models of
redistributive justice, however incompletely they may have been put into practice – should
have taken place in California and that many of the citizens of California followed
electoral suit on November 4, 1996 by abolishing “affirmative action”. Those less
concerned with the consequences surrounding the eventful November 4, 1996 may argue
that while the abolition of “affirmative action” has put a stop on the preferential treatment
of groups of citizens on the basis of the concept of difference, it has not put a stop on
respecting the actual diversity and multiculturality of California. After all, since California
is, next to Texas, the major immigration states in the United States, major immigration
flows will continue to reach it, and with these flows immigrants will continue to participate
in the formation of ethnic groups and identities. Historically, California not only received
major immigration from Latin American countries via Mexico, but also, and in the wake of
increasing transnational migration flows, it has absorbed many exiles and immigrants from
the Pacific Rim, from Japan, China, Korea, Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands, to name but a
few. Since 1989, it has also been a major port of entry for immigrants from the former state
socialist countries. The 25% increase in population in the period from 1980 to 1990 in
California is mostly due to processes of population movements in the age of global
migration.
8
 While demographic predictions estimate that the overall population of the
United States will be 50% white and 50% non-white by the year 2050, the percentage of
non-whites to whites will probably be higher in border states such as California and Texas,
due not only to continuous major immigration waves from Latin America but also to the
higher birth rate among Hispanic families as compared to many other ethnic groups. A
simple look at the demographics of California in relation to “affirmative action” may lead
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one to the simple conclusion that since the ethnic composition of the state of California
naturally continues to diversify with dramatic increases in migration flows to California – it
is, after all, as mentioned above, the number one U.S. American immigration state – its
institutions, including its universities, should eventually reflect the natural diversity of its
population. Given such processes of ethnic diversification due to immigration, “affirmative
action”, so one might argue, would sooner or later anyhow become obsolete, if diversity is
the ultimate issue and goal. While there resides some merit in such argument, the social
bias inscribed in it contains none: since admission to the university, as explained above,
hinges on meeting stiff eligibility requirements, not meeting such requirements becomes
the condition for exclusion from education in California’s public universities. Given that
high academic scores are usually linked – and nowadays more than every before – to the
economic status of a student’s family or to culturally specific attitudes towards high
scholarly achievement, students belonging to the upper echelons of society will meet
eligibility requirements, and those from the lower echelons will not. And conversely, if
culturally specific attitudes towards high scholarly achievements are the mark of some
ethnic groups, students belonging to these ethnic groups will get the necessary scores,
without necessarily commanding the increasing financial means indispensable for study at
the university. Those students commanding greater economic resources will typically enjoy
greater chances for being admitted to the public universities in the post-affirmative action
period, and those students who do not command similar resources will not.
9
 In other
words, in the absence of “affirmative action” programs, the increasing diversity of
California’s population will not necessarily proportionately diversify the population of its
universities. As far as the ethnic groups are concerned, it is likely that although Asian
American do not constitute the largest ethnic group in California, students of Asian descent
will proportionately profit from the abolition of “affirmative action”. Many students from
Asian American families are not only culturally and socially predisposed for preparing
themselves for meeting high educational standards, but are also overall moving into
economic positions which will allow them to meet rising fees, particularly if they are
second or third generation Asian Americans. For Asian Americans are, just as Italian
Americans or European Americans and many others, part of those immigrant groups
whose economic achievements and status typically increase over a few generations. While
Asian American students may proportionately win access to the university, African
American students, Native American students, and Hispanic students will
disproportionately loose. The minority equation will no longer hold. Surely, even at the
prestigious Berkeley campus, which has the highest eligibility and admission requirements
of all of the nine University of California campuses – only the upper 10% of all of Califor-
nia high school graduates typically are eligible to apply –, the undergraduate student body
may not ever again return to being primarily European American and white, as it was the
case in the pre-affirmative action decades. Yet it will not reflect the diversity of
California’s population either. In other words, there is little reason to assume that flows of
immigration will no longer arrive in California. Yet there is reason to believe that the
newly arriving immigrants will be able neither to become eligible to be considered for
admission at the University of California, nor to pay its continuously increasing tuition and
fees. Are we to conclude that the multicultural educational experiment, which enabled
hundreds of minority students to enter professional sites – as it brought enormous benefit
to minority communities, since minority students, turned professionals, in large numbers
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return to their community in order to serve it – are we to conclude that the multicultural
educational project based on social justice has come to an end?
California, as the major immigration state of the United States, experiences major
immigration waves as it continues to house those sites of revolutionary technological
transformations – microelectronics, biotechnology, telecommunications, robotics, com-
puters, and software – which see themselves increasingly challenged by competition from
European and Asian regions. Given this double matrix informing Californian cutting edge
material existence, it should come as no surprise if Californians indicate particular
propensities for republican political issues. The passage of Proposition 209 makes this
point. California’s extraordinary propensities for the formation of a multicultural
consciousness, what I have termed the “California Multicultural Dialectic” at the moment
accommodates the republican call to arms. As I have tried to show elsewhere, this
accommodation was also facilitated by widespread multicultural indifference to issues of
class. While affirmations of race, ethnicity, and gender may be able to afford the dismissal
of the issue of class as long as class, or economic justice, is not an issue, once class, in its
form as economic survival, becomes an issue, it becomes indifferent to notions of race,
ethnicity, and gender. This is, it seems to me, what the case of California invites us to see.
As I finish this article, the constitutionality of Proposition 209 is getting repeatedly tested
in the California courts. The survival of the “affirmative action” model, and with it, its
social history in the struggle for civil rights, will ultimately stand the test of time not
because a variety of judges deem it constitutional, but rather because a majority of people
will be able to recognize the injustice of economic injustice next to other forms of injustice.
The promises of an authentic multicultural education begin and end there.
Notes
1. One of the most power ful empirical sociological analyses of current global transformations taking place
is Castells’s book (1996).
2. Skrentny (1996) traces the history of the model of affirmative action in its relation to prevailing notions
of justice in U.S. American culture at large. He also relates specific policies adopted by various
administrations in relation to civil rights to the changing moral function of the United States in
international relations.
3. For a brief overview of the multicultural educational policies in  the universities of California see Steiner-
Khamsi (1992: 169-174 and 193-198). Cahn’s (1995) recent edition points to the prob lematics of the
issue of “affirmative action”.
4. One of the most crucial volumes to capture the extent of the debate is Gutmann (1994).
5. For a discussion of the relation between economic status and scholarly achievement see Frank and Cook
(1995), in particular chapter 8, “The Battle for Educational Prestige”, pp. 147-166. See also Wolff
(1996: 15-20). For income levels as these relate to race and ethnicity see Roberts (1994: 279-304).
6. One of the most significant theorist of classical liberalism who systematically upholds this tradition
is John Rawls. See his recent edition (1993).
7. See the Karabel report (Karabel 1989).
8. See Castles and Miller (1993) for a concise introduction of contempora ry global migration.
9. One of the most recent responses to the racist proposition that some racial or ethnic groups
academically perform worse than others due to their race is the collective study by Fischer et al.
(1996). They point to the many social and economic ways by which a young person becomes
ineligible for academic requirements.
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